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Article 6

Law and Conscience
Paul V Niemeyed
Sir Thomas More agreed to accept appointment as Chancellor
of England in 1529 on receipt of the promise that he would not
be required to involve himself in the business of Henry VIII's
divorce from Catherine of Aragon, a divorce that Henry was attempting to rationalize because his marriage had not produced a
male heir. After a divorce was declared by Henry's recently appointed Archbishop of Canterbury and Henry married Anne
Boleyn, More failed to attend the wedding. More also refused to
swear allegiance to the Act of Succession which declared Henry's
first marriage void and legitimized the children of his second
marriage as heirs to the throne. Although More was willing to
acknowledge that Boleyn was queen, he refused to take an oath
because the oath would require him to repudiate the Pope's supremacy in the Church, a position Henry had recently designated
for himself in respect to the Church of England. More was tried
on perjured testimony for denying Henry's title, convicted, and
beheaded.
In his play centered on the trial, Robert Bolt in A Man for All
Seasons, dramatizing the tension between More's duty to the
throne and his obedience to conscience, describes the core role of
conscience:
Wolsey: England needs an heir .... Now explain how you as
Councilor of England can obstruct those measures for the sake
'of your own, private, conscience.
More: Well ... I believe, when statesmen forsake their own
private conscience for the sake of their public duties .. . they

lead their country by a short route to chaos.'
While More thus places conscience at the core of order, he never
forsook positive law or his duty to the throne. Indeed, he recog:
nized that not only does conscience inform within the law, but
positive law provides a value in the order established. Thus when
f-

* United States Circuit Judge, Fourth Circuit. A.B., Kenyon College, 1962; LL.B.,
Univeristy of Notre Dame, 1966.
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More was pressed by Roper to have a betraying "friend" arrested,
More observed that, having broken no law, the "friend" should go
free even if he.was the Devil.
More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law
to get after the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil
turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws
all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast
to coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them
down-and you're just the man to do it-d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.'
The same chaos, predicted by More for the conduct of political affairs without conscience, can be predicted, I respectfully
suggest in this essay, for judicial decisionmaking without resort to
conscience. This is not to say that decisionmaking can forsake
positive law in the name of conscience, but that it is only conscience that can verify and elevate the law. Without the guidance
of conscience, pure reason exercised even in the strictest constraints applicable to judicial decisionmaking is given too many
alternatives to be guided to "right" solutions. Without suggesting
any weakening of the constraints imposed on judges in their
decisionmaking function, i.e., to begin with the facts, apply the law
as it was intended by the lawmaker, and reason to judgment, I
suggest that the judicial process cannot and does not preclude a
judge's proper consultation with conscience. Even though the
judicial resolution of a case that falls directly under a provision of
statutory law may be governed only by the value inherent in the
provision, when legislation leaves gaps to be filled by judicial interpretation, a participating value from the judge is introduced.
Through application of law to new situations not directly governed
by prior law or statute, judicially-made law is developed, and in
the absence of responding to what is "right," such decisions neutral to conscience could not be expected to satisfy the human
sense of justice. In the absence of conscience, which is a constant
anchor in the human makeup which demands that we do what
ought to be done, law will roam with unguided logic to any num-
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ber of possibilities which never can be verified as "right," even
though our sense of justice demands only that which is "right."
Yet, there is a wind blowing these days that brings with it the
suggestion that any guidance from moral norms or resort to conscience is inappropriate in judicial decisionmaking because such
influences introduce the "personal feelings" of judges with their
unlimited diversity. The alleged subjectivity of conscience, or of
any moral norm that derives from conscience, it is argued, would
separate the judicial decisions from the intent of statutes and thus
the democratic will and would lead to an unacceptable indeterminacy in the law which seeks predictability.
In his much publicized book, The Tempting of America, Judge
Robert H. Bork articulates the widely held view, perhaps now
representing a trend. He writes, when a judge is "in his robes,
[he] must adopt a posture of moral abstention .

.

. ."

The only

value he should bring to the process is constraint, which Bork
characterizes as "the morality of the jurist."4 Such a limited view
of the role of judicial morality derives from the premise that there
is no moral reality. Judge Bork states that moral inquiry can never
lead to a "universally accepted system" because it never has.5 He
thus reasons to the conclusion:
Without agreement on the moral final state we do not
know where we should be going and hence cannot agree upon
the starting place for reasoning. If we have no way of judging
rival premises, we have no way of arguing to moral conclusions
that should be accepted by all. "In a society where there is no
longer a shared conception of the community's good as specified by the good for man, there can no longer either be any
very substantial concept of what it is to contribute more or less
to the achievement of that good."'
Recognizing the same difficulty in utilizing concepts of morality in judicial decisionmaking, Judge Richard A. Posner likewise
seems to conclude that there is no moral reality. In his book, The
Problems ofJurisprudence,Judge Posner states:
The underlying problem of moral objectivity is that there are
neither facts to which moral principles correspond (as scientific
principles, for example, appear to correspond to things in na-

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 259 (1990).
4 Id at 178.
5 Id. at 254.
6 Id at 256 (quoting ALASDAIR MACINTRYE, AFrER VIRTUE 232 (1984)).
3
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ture) nor a strong tendency for moral principles to converge.7

Judge Posner concludes that "the enterprise, now several thousand
years old, of establishing the existence and content of a natural
law that underwrites positive law is hopeless under the conditions
of modern American society."8
Judge Bork and Judge Posner are not alone, and their views
are shared by a substantial segment of academia, the judiciary, and
even Justices on the Supreme Court. Moreover, the argument is
not new. Rooted in some of the writings of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who expressed the hope for seeking scientific certainty in
the law by resorting only to positive law and reason,9 the debate
whether morality can have a role in judicial decisionmaking has
today reached full bloom. This is witnessed in recent times by the
now famous exchange of articles about whether morality has a
place in the law, debated by Professor H.L.A. Hart and Professor
Lon L. Fuller in the Harvard Law Review in 1958.0 Moreover, as
a trend of demanding moral neutrality in the courts continues, it
is indeed ironic that simultaneously we witness increasing over-dependence by members of society on the law to provide their only
source of moral guidance. The phenomenon is manifested by
commonly heard "wisdoms" such as, "If it's not illegal, it's not
wrong," or "There's nothing wrong with lying because I wasn't
under oath," or "It's okay so long as you're not caught."
One suspects that the movement to moral neutrality in modem jurisprudence is driven not so much by any aversion to morality, but rather by a frustration deriving from the inability to
reach agreement on its demands and the suspicion that somehow
the morality of lawmakers reflected in legislative enactments is
different from that of judicial decisionmakers. An additional underlying motive, which will not be explored further in this essay,
may be the intuited idea that any state-sponsored subscription to
morality would somehow violate current notions of separation of
church and state. Even though theoretical problems persist in the
appropriate relation between law and morality, their existence
does not mandate the categorical abandonment of moral guidance

7

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENcE 236 (1990).

8 Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
9 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457 (1897) (an
Address delivered at the dedication of a new building at Boston University School of
Law).
10
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in the enactment and interpretation of law. Quite the opposite
appears to be true. At. the most general level, we can never say
that the community should embrace law and obey it when the
command of the law is inconsistent with or neutral to the
community's own moral sense. Those subject to the law demand
no less than the harmony of having the law's commands remain
consistent with their sense of what "ought to be" and that when
they obey the law they are doing the "right thing."
In this brief essay that is intended only to introduce the idea,
I suggest that the law, moral codes, and indeed even organized
religion all are externalized- manifestations, directed to somewhat
different ends, that have a common source in conscience. Thus if
we were able to recognize and embrace efforts to invoke conscience in judicial decisionmaking, we could bypass the articulated
pitfalls of consulting any externalized list of moral norms that so
troubles the moral skeptics. This idea, while perhaps not new,
must be described only after some preliminary observations about
morality and conscience.
The human condition is fundamentally characterized by a
state of incompletion, or call it imperfection, giving human beings
choices which, by the exercise of free will, enable them to move
closer to or further from what they perceive to be perfect or complete. In this usage, imperfection does not automatically mean
flawed, but certainly that perfection is not attained. The gap between perfection and imperfection in the area of human conduct
can be narrowed by doing that which "ought to be done." Humankind has a unique ability to .perceive notions of perfection
and to imagine that if humans were able to become perfect, any
need for moral norms or laws would disappear. While that obviously can never occur, our ability to move toward perfection with
the exercise of will creates hope that feeds the effort. As we are
able to conceive the perfect and measure our shortfall against it,
we can also identify and determine the shape of morality's demands.
While perfection is readily conceived about some things, relationships, or conduct, it is more difficult to conceive or describe
about others. Our notions about perfection are also distorted by
what serves our self interest, by external pressures, and by emotion
and physical appetites. Nevertheless, we find it with respect to
conduct, to the extent we are humanly able, by asking ourselves,
"Without regard to self interest, what is the right thing to do; what
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ought I to do?" The inquiry of one's inner self is what yields moral
norms.
In the same pattern that morality is derived for personal conduct, so too, I submit, is law derived for political relations. Do we
ever acknowledge that, when we have adopted a law or made a
legal decision, we were trying to prescribe the wrong thing? Such
an idea is foreign to the community's idea of law and it would
readily reject it. Because any law or legal decision reaches to accomplish the right thing in the given circumstances, law is but the
political surrogate of morality, consisting of rules among people in
the community consistent with what ought to be the order to provide harmony, peace and enhancement of the common good.
Undoubtedly, we must be quick to recognize that human-made
law, even though we say it usually represents what the lawmaker
believes ought to be the law, does not purport to be a moral code
but only an ordering mechanism which is subject to political pressures, pragmatic conditions, and the imperfections of the lawmakers. The product will always fall short against any measure of perfection. Nevertheless, the adoption of laws, the practice of law,
and the application and interpretation of law does contain an
aspiration to that which we think is right to satisfy the human
sense of justice. The law in its imperfect manifestation thus attempts continuously to move to "what ought to be."
If law, whether the enactment, its application and practice, or
its interpretation, were not responsive, in each of those aspects, to
what is right or what ought to be, it would lose its vitality as a
system of acceptable rules among human beings. It would not
serve the function of purporting to make up, by legal mandate,
for that imperfection that we have about ourselves and our political relationships. To the extent that a community accepts any legal
system, the law (and its interpretation) responds to the
community's sense of what is right, just, and fair.
To view the particular effort of judges who have developed
the common law, we find not surprisingly the same objects of
doing what is right, just, and fair. The long history of the common law from the earliest records reveals a progressive movement
of substituting legal or equitable solutions that accord with one's
sense of right and fairness for solutions attained by force. And
what is noteworthy is that the cases, for the most part, do not rely
on any externalized code or system of morality, but rather they
represent a judge's sense of what is "right" and 'Just" in the circumstances of the existing law and the facts. Within the con-
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straints of stare decisis and the limited role of judicial
decisionmaking, judges turn to their "guts," their inner "intincts,"
to verify their decisions. If the question directed to this inner self
seeks what is right, fair, or just, it appeals to one's moral sense,
centered in conscience. Thus the common law, to the extent it
represents a collection of conscience-oriented decisions develops
like any system of morality, natural law, and indeed even religion.
But the common law is iot dependent on a system of morality, or
natural law; rather, it is a parallel system aimed at a different
purpose, but having emanated from the same source. It is only
because of this parallelism that permits us thus to seek justice in
the affairs of a secular state and maintain religion separately.
Judge Bork makes a remarkable statement in The Tempting of
America when he says:
Any lawyer or judge who is honest with himself knows that he
often intuits a conclusion and then goes to work to see if legal
reasoning supports it. But the original intuition arises out of
long familiarity with the structure and processes of law. A judge
will have such intuitions in cases where he has not the remotest personal preference about the outcome."
While Judge Bork seems to be confessing apologetically for this
perhaps undisciplined bow to intuition, he may be saying that
when judges make legal decisions, they consult their inner sense
of what is right and apply it to the framework or a grid of statute,
precedent, and facts. The posturing of a question directed to
one's inner self in search of the right thing or the just result is,
what may be characterized, a consultation with conscience.
Reaching to this inner self, this inner core, which every human being does regularly in the course of making decisions and
exercising will, has long been recognized. Augustine described the
process as follows:
[D]on't go outside yourself, return into yourself. The dwellingplace of truth is in the inner man. And if you discover your
own nature as subject to change, then go beyond that nature.
But remember that, when you thus go beyond it, it is the reasoning soul which you go beyond. Press on, therefore, toward
the source from which the light of reason itself is kindled. 2

11 BORE, supra note 3, at 71.
12 CHARLES N. COCHRANE, CHRISTIANnY
from DE VERA RELIC.).

AND CLASSICAL CuLTURE

409 (1957) (quoting
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Augustine calls this kindling light "the creative principle" which is
eternal, immutable, self-sufficient, the source of all being, of all
wisdom and of all perfection."
Moreover, C. S. Lewis, in The Abolition of Man, notes that this
human aspect, that tells us what "ought" to be and establishes
value, has been described to exist by members of all major civilizations, both in the far eastern and western worlds. He describes it:
It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all
value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The
effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is
self-contradictory. There never has been, and never will be, a
radically new judgment of value in the history of the
world .... The human mind has no more power of inventing

a new value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in."
And it is not surprising that Pope John Paul II describes this
inner source of value as conscience. When addressing the youth of
America in a speech in Denver, Colorado, on August 14, 1993,
admonishing them that the danger of our current scientific society
is the want to "manipulate conscience and its demands," the Pope
stated:
Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a person
where we are alone with God. In the depths of his conscience
man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but
which holds him to obedience.
Whatever we call that inner core which responds to the inquiry, "what ought I to do," it is simply a matter of convention. Because of the variations of our makeup, when we externalize matters of conscience by descriptions and systems, they begin to appear as different as each person's words. But this is not unlike the
variations in description that we give about objects in nature. The
core, or the source, however, has the same quality in each of us.
To whatever degree it is perceived, it is, for purposes of the law,
always ascribed words or language such as justice, equity, reason,
fairness, and right-that in the law which directs what we ought to
do, Since we all seem to share this sense, we would expect some
agreement on its manifestations.

13
14
15

Id.
C.S. LEWis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 56-57 (1947).
Speech To Youth, N.Y. TIMEs, August 15, 1993.
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Outside the law, sociological studies have confirmed the reality and uniformity of a moral sense in humans. Professor James Q.
Wilson, in The Moral Sense, has drawn on a remarkable collection
of data and concluded that conscience in each human being is
the source of a common moral sense and this moral sense is innate. He states:
We do have a core self, not wholly the product of culture, that
includes both a desire to advance our own interests and a
capacity to judge disinterestedly how those interests ought to be
advanced. Our selfish desires and moral capacities are at war
with one another, and often the former triumphs over the
latter. However great this war may be and no matter how often
we submerge our better instincts in favor of our baser ones, We
are almost always able, in our calm and disinterested moments,
to feel the tug of our better nature. In those moments we know
the difference between being human and being inhuman. 6
Professor Wilson notes that even at the earliest ages, the moral sense of human beings begins to manifest itself. Observations of
children in various cultures have revealed that:
[T]here are some things that young children regard as wrong
whether they are middle-class residents of Hyde Park, Illinois,
or Hindus living in the Indian village of Bhtibaneswar. These
include breaking a promise, stealing flowers, kicking a harmless
animal, and destroying another's property."
And in adults, one aspect of the moral sense, which Wilson describes as innately part of each of us, is a sense of fairness.
It is uncanny how the sociological data which Wilson reports
reveals a human sense of fairness that corresponds directly to
doctrines in the common law. Wilson found, for instance, that
humankind's moral sense of fairness includes aspects of equity (in
which we hold that "[p]eople who are equal with respect to contributions should be equal with respect to outcomes"), reciprocity
("[p]eople who have given something to you are entitled to something back"), and impartiality ("[p] eople who judge another person
ought to be disinterested, free of favoritism, and observant of rules
agreed upon in advance")."s These demonstrated aspects of the
moral sense are manifested, almost with the same words, in the

16 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 11 (1993) (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 141.
18 Id. at 70.
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law through concepts such as equity, unjust enrichment, due process, and rule of law. Although it would serve only curiosity to
summarize even the major findings of Professor Wilson, it is useful
here to include his observation about the history of the moral
sense, which also may parallel the history of law:
What is remarkable-indeed, what constitutes the most astonishing thing about the moral development of humanity-has
been the slow, uneven, but more or less steady expansion of
the idea that the moral sense ought to govern a wide
range-perhaps, indeed, the whole range-of human interactions. Our universe has been enlarged. 9
These parallels are not surprising if our moral sense and our law
are both manifestations from the same source.
The moral reality, which sociologists have discovered, has
been described in the legal context by many, but particularly well
by Professor Michael S. Moore in his 1982 landmark article, Moral
Reality.2 While the scope of this essay unfortunately cannot attempt to synthesize Professor Moore's response to those who
would have the law evolve through judicial decisions made in a
morally neutral manner, the existence of his studies and their
conclusions remains a source of corroboration and comfort. But
yet more corroborating and comforting is an actual, but brief,
look at cases where judges have appeared to rely on conscience,
even when professing not to have done so in their
decisionmaking.
In Matter of Baby M,21 the court appears to have relied on
conscience to evaluate whether to enforce a "surrogacy contract,"
even though it professed to be expressing morally neutral New
Jersey public policy. In the case, Mary Beth Whitehead freely
agreed, for payment of ten thousand dollars, to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of William Stem, whose own marriage
could not produce a baby, to carry the baby to term, and then to
deliver the baby to Mr. Stem with no strings attached. In the contract, which had been carefully drafted by attorneys, Whitehead
also agreed to facilitate the adoption of the baby by Mrs. Stern so
that Mr. and Mrs. Stem would be the baby's sole parents thereafter. As might be expected, however, Whitehead was unwilling

19 Id. at 193.
20 See Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wisc. L. REv. 1061; see also Michael Moore,
Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992) (a recent follow-up article).
21 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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upon delivery of the baby to fracture one of nature's strongest
bonds and separate from the baby. She defaulted on the ill-conceived surrogacy contract. While the court set aside the contract
and "restore[d] the 'surrogate' as the mother of the child,"' it
rationalized that it was required to reach that conclusion by the
public policy that parents raise their own children. There were,
however, other rational public policies such as the freedom to
make contracts and the right to adopt children in New Jersey,
either of which might just as rationally have supported a different
result. The court, however, resolved the so-called competing rational considerations by, what I submit, was a resort to conscience.
As the court said:
There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy ....
There are, in short, values that society deems
niore important than granting to wealth whatever it can buy,
be it labor, love, or life.
The surrogacy contract is based on principles that are directly
contrary to the objectives of our laws.'
Similarly confronted with issues requiring a resort to conscience, the court in Matter of Karen Quinlan,24 was faced with the
question of whether ending the artificial life-support systems was a
rightful matter of self-determination for Karen Quinlan (by her
guardian and family) or the taking of the life of another. Quinlan
lay in a hopeless, comatose and vegetative state, "having no awareness of anything or anyone around her and existing at a primitive
reflex level."' Although the court professed to be following morally neutral principles, it recited extensively the moral advice received by Quinlan's family, and in the end the court seems to
have rested on that advice. In allowing the guardian and the family of Quinlan to remove artificial life-support systems, the court
observed that that decision "should be accepted by a society the
overwhelming, majority of whose members would, we think, in
similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for
themselves or for those closest to them."26 The court was not
yielding to a-majority will on such a personal matter but rather

22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1249-50.
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1971).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 664.
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appears only to have found corroboration for its individual determination of what was right from society's consensus of conscience.
These cases are representative of situations where the judge's
sense of what is "right" were applied to select from equally rational alternatives. Indeed, they reveal that pure reason cannot make
judgments. The same type of decisionmaking can be observed in
Supreme Court decisions, particularly when the Court imposes
limits on constitutional rights. Thus, while the First Amendment
secures simply the "freedom of speech," the Supreme Court has
limited that right when it is outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. The Court stated in Chaplinsky v. New Hamp27
shire.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem .... It has

been well-observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morali8
2

ty

Similarly, in connection with the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that the clause will not
protect state action that "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."2 9 If we take the Court at its word about due process, we are instructed that fundamental rights may be equated to
those emanating from conscience, so long as it is sufficiently manifested to have become "the conscience of our people."
In recent times the Court protests regularly that it is not
applying any moral standard, but even in cases with such statements the decision seems to reach for the moral standard's
source. In determining, for instance, what liberties are appropriate
and which are licentious, the Court resorts to '"the demands of
organized society" and "reasoned judgment." In Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,'" the Court explained, "Our obligation is to define the

27 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28 Id. at 571-572 (quoted approvingly as recently as 1992 in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)).
29 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1935) (emphasis added). This has
been quoted numerous times since; see, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977).
30 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
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liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." While no one
would suggest that any judge's personal moral code should be a
factor in decisionmaking, the statement, we can suppose, leaves
open the possibility that manifestations of conscience, corroborated by the consensus, is still a viable factor in making constitutional
decisions. No other explanation can be given for the Court's deci1 where the Court
sion in Bowers v. Hardwick,"
was asked to decide
whether Georgia's sodomy statute violated a liberty interest,
claimed in homosexual conduct, under the Fourteenth Amendment. Recognizing that ithad previously recognized either a liberty interest or a right of privacy in procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion, and had struck down statutes that regulated
them, the Court was faced in Bowers with a method for rationally
distinguishing Georgia's sodomy statute. Suggesting that it was
leaving such moral judgments to the states for determination, and
indicating that such rights could not be found in the
Constitution's text, the Court nevertheless imposed a moral result
inconsistent with what a purely rational process would have yielded
when it left standing a criminal statute prohibiting sodomy. It explained, "The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be
very busy indeed. 2 Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the opinion, however, writes more. revealingly:
[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient roots."
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards."3
If the Court had applied purely rational methods, neutral to any
moral judgment, it would have been left with no basis for holding
as it did. Yet, because of the Court's recently adopted aversion to
relying on conscience, it refused to acknowledge its reliance on
conscience in the decision, leaving readers confused about the
source of the decision.

31
32
33

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
478 U.S. at 196.
478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Again, when defining the limits of the Eighth Amendment,
which by its terms concededly invokes value judgment, the Court
nevertheless did not hesitate to apply a standard that approves de
minimis force so long as it is "not of the sort repugnant to the
conscience of mankind."' And in a similar vein, when interpreting
the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Court defined the limit as that which violates "'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice. ,"35
It would appear that if these cases are at all representative,
Professor Graham Walker was on to something when he observed:
Constitutional theory--undoubtedly like all normative political
theory-cannot avoid reliance upon moral premises. Moral
premises cannot avoid referring to the good (or the right) that
they inescapably presuppose. The good cannot successfully
actuate moral thinking unless it is perceived to be a real and
intrinsically moral good; only such a good allows for satisfactory
answers to normative questions.ss
While we can reason in judicial decisions to results that we
reject because they are unjust, the contrary is not true. We do not
abandon a just decision because the reason is not apparent. Consultation with conscience yields answers to whether something is
right or just, and it is thus more dependable and constrained than
resort to pure reason which usually yields more alternatives. Once
conscience selects a rational alternative within the constraintsgiven a
judge, the judge may rationalize the result or even acknowledge, if
the judge is ingenuous, that reason cannot fully articulate why the
result is just. But this candor is rarely shown. Yet it may have been
this very process that prompted Justice Stewart to say about pornography:
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at
least by negative implication in the Court's decisions since Roth
and Alberts, that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hardcore pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion

34 Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (emphasis added).
35 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973). See also, Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (holding that substantive due process prevents the government from
engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience").
36

GRAHAM WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 13 (1990).
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picture involved in this case is not that.37

Because resort to conscience selects from rational alternatives,
and the opposite cannot be true, decisions based on conscience
would likely be more dependable and more readily accepted. It
also follows that they will be more, not less, predictable than purely reasoned decisions. While we can never reject the reasoning
process-it is the only method we have for conducting analysis-we must recognize its limits. It permits us to get from one
point to another in an analysis, but it does not corroborate the
original point or the end point. The process may be similar to
balancing a checkbook. By the perfectly rational process of lower
mathematics, we add and subtract checks from the balance shown
in our checkbooks. That the reasoning is perfect, however, does
not preclude the question of whether the balance is correct because the beginning balance or any check thereafter may be imperfectly recorded. So it is, I suggest, with the analysis of legal
issues that depend solely on the rational process.
Cases are decided from conscience when the judge is able to
say that the decision is responsive to the question, "Is this decision
the right thing to do without regard to self-interest, political or
external pressure, or emotion?" Of course, the "right" thing also
includes constraint as described by Judge Bork. But within that
constraint, the pasture is wide, and only conscience will pick a just
road. Even though the judge thus moves inwardly to satisfy the
judge's sense of justice, he must by reason and language manifest
his findings in a decision. But rather than injecting an externally
developed moral norm between the question and the answer, the
decision from conscience discovers a legal norm-the holding of
the case.
Because no one has the ability to yield decisions of perfection, and foreign influences can never be fully removed from
decisionmaking, any one decision cannot be confidently asserted
as a right one or as absolutely correct. But when decision after
decision is made in response to "what is right," a closer approach
to the right is achieved. While the consensus of decisions may be,
and should be, consulted to corroborate the next decision, in
each case the question must be posed anew, "How is justice
achieved?" If we catalog ten such decisions, a hundred decisions,

37 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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or a thousand, all in which the decisionmaker consults the inner
self, the conscience, without first articulating external norms, a
consensus nevertheless emerges in a common law. The repetitive
process, perhaps habit, of continuously consulting with conscience
and corroborating the result with prior such decisions produces a
fabric or a mosaic. Moreover, with increased data and study, the
differences among decisions may lessen, although they never disappear. But to that extent, we approximate a conscience of the community, or a consensus.
Thus the discipline of decisionmaking will be improved if recognition of the role of conscience is recognized, and better yet,
voiced and reevaluated with each decision. The task may not always be simple and the results may at times look confusing. What
did Justice Stewart mean when he said about pornography, "I
know it when I see it"? While that might not be recognized as the
best method for articulating it, such frustrations from time to time
should not discourage the effort.
The alternative can lead only to chaos. It is a deceptive and
confusing approach to rely on conscience in making judicial decisions but then attempt to redefine such reliance as the product of
reason or a morally neutral principle. When we voice recognition
of invocations of conscience and heighten our awareness of the
process, decisionmaking will arch closer to what is right without
the need of articulating a separate externalized code of moral
norms. I submit, let the study of ethics, morality, natural law, and
religion run their separate courses. At the end of the day, we may
notice that those courses tend to converge with the vast body of
law so developed. Indeed, they must, since they all are illuminated
by the same conscience.

